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1. Introduction 
In April 1974, at the conclusion of the Sixth Sess·ion on Raw Materials" 
the United National General Assembly (unanimously but without vote) 
adopted a declaration on the establ,ishment of,a neW international 
economic order. This testified to growing pressure for changing the 
balance of forces in the world. It also reflected the f~ct that the 
struggle for modifying the balance of power between Third World 
countries vis-a-vis First and Second World countries had entered into 
a new stage. First and Second Worl,d countries, pressed by t:J:l~ir ruling 
classes and productive structures; seek to consolidate their hegemoney 
albeit with modified terms, and to secure the continued expansion and 
protection of their economies and welfare, supported by 'the-maIntenance 
of asymmetric relations with the Third World countries. 
The leaders of the Third World countries,_ affected by growing 
pressure of the masses, want to secure national self-reliant 
development and are at the same time urged to secure a major share in 
the benefits of resource mobilisation for the old and/or new ruling 
classes. They therefore seek to modify the tepms of these relationships. 
The First and Second World countries attempt to secure continued 
subordination and incorporation of Third World countries in a world-
wide 'free market' system; at the same time, Third World countries 
strive to extract themselves from their dependent status. This 
foments an accumulative movement of contradictions. As the 'Three 
Worlds' grow together, these contradictions have tended to become 
deeper. 
The search for unity through incorporation and subordination 
generates a search for independence (experienced as division by the 
former ,colonisers); in turn, "the ,search for 'independence engenders 
growing pressure for new forms of unity (incorporation into the' 
established framework). On the United Nations forum, the speeches by 
the representatives of the 'Three Worlds,' which each seek to maintain 
or modify the balance of power, testify to deep-rooted antagonistic 
interests. At the same time a strong appeal is made to a common 
interest, that of mankind~ First and Second worldreprese~tatives' tend 
to stress the dangers of confrontation resulting from the struggle for 
redistribution of wealth and power, and consider international order 
and peaceful co-existence as prerequisites (e.g. the speech by the 
U.S.A~ Secretary of State at the Sixth Special Session). The opposite 
view (e.g. the speeches by the Algerian and Tanzanian representatives 
at the same session) predicates development and peace upon the 
establishment of 'A new economic order' which does away with the 
'remaining vestiges of alien domination, colonialism and neo-colonialism'; 
insists that 'there can be no peaceful co-existence between poverty 
and affluence, development and underdevelopment,' as long as a 'minority 
of highly developed countries determines at will the allocation of the 
world's resources,' and protests against a process which 'continually 
impoverishes the poor and enriches, the rich~' The view expressed by 
the Secretary General of the United Nations, that equity and peace 
require fundamental changes in the relations between countries, stands 
in sharp contrast to the opinion of the representative of a major 
power who, in December 1974, spoke of the 'tyranny of the new majority.' 
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There is a tendency to reduce.the problem of'polarised.development 
to that of unequal exchange relations rather than to view these . 
relations as the manifestation of the expanded reproduction of . 
existing productive relations (the combination of internal 
production relations with production, political and ideological 
rel~tions on a world scale, which blocks the development of 
productive forces in the third world countries~. ~n~ven~o~~~~ed 
development.is acutely expressed in the way in which control is 
exercised oVer science and technology. This paper is an· attempt to 
explore some of the interdependencies between science/technology 
and intra- and inter-society processes. 
2. The interdependent development. of productive forces, 
productive relations and ideology 
It is generally recognised that the development of science and its 
application in technology have played a major role in the prodigious 
development of productive forces during past years, and that it is 
not an exaggeration to speak ofa scientific and technological 
revolution. The impressive rise in the material standard of living 
in· the rich countries during the last decades is the direct result 
of the fact that, unlike in the past, science has become a direct 
part of productive forces and capital. However, the conviction that 
the development of productive forces could somehow solve .the world's 
problems. is ·now seriously questioned. It is now realised that 
uncontrolled growth has hrought about multiple hazards which, if they 
do not immediately threaten man's survival, at least compel mankind 
to look .for ways to control the newly unieashed forces so that they 
can be of benefit. The relentless growth of the productive forces 
cannot be.attributed to the absence of control but, on the contrary, 
to the predominance of particular forms of cont~ol which instrumentalise 
science and technology for the purpose of maximizing ·accumulation, 
growth and profi tabili ty. 1) The development of science and technology 
has always been bound up with the relativeadvanta,geswhich successive 
dominant classes were able to acquire by using and promoting it •. 
Simply because of its universality, the clas~ nature of sci~nce 
and technology is so much taken for granted .that pointing to it may 
cause surprise, if not ind1gnation.2) This reaction is not unusual if 
it is assumed that science and· technology are 'something' in their own 
right and, therefore, should not be 'mixed up'. with economic and 
political life. This reaction suggests to what extent the view that 
science and technology are autonomous has become internalised. This 
internalisation may be considered as only one dimension of the.general 
process of people's adaptation to the requirements of the dominant mode 
of production which needs to portray itself and its consequences as 
basically beneficial, inevitable and rational. In particular, it is 
suggested that its productive relations (not only property relations 
andthe structure of product.ive organisation, but also the o:):'ganisation 
of society and the State in as far as these support dominant productive 
relations) are identical with, and a natural extension of the 
development of productive forces. As a consequence, people are expected 
to perceive their subordination to the requirements of the productive 
apparatus as natural, that is to say that they cease to perceive it 
as subordination. 3) 
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One of the consequences of the adaptation of productive relations 
to the development of productive forces is that the possible need 
for transforming these relations is excluded. This inevitably diverts 
attention from change as a historical process and tends to shroud 
any perception of historical change, thereby reducing history to 
what is judged valid, 'and, therefore, legitimate, in the prevailing 
dominant values. 4) Another closely connected consequence is. that 
a unilinear vision of development is propagated. In this view it . 
is proposed that all countr~es and peoples wishing to 'achieve 
development' must pass through the same process, follow.the same 
procedures and apply the same techniques as have been implemented in 
the industrially advanced countries. 5) Thus, development is equated 
with what the dominant classes in the most advanced countries judge 
as desirable. 
In this way the original function of science as a methodological 
and experimental approach to concrete problems which, in a particular 
. context,' require specific solutions, is substituted for the mechanical 
application of imported formulas which have not been devised to respond 
to national or local problems. Thus, science loses its orig;!,pal 
function as the search from within for solutions ,I to be adapted to 
varying problems. Instead of being an instrument to identify_real 
issues and find alternative approaches, leading to new 'projets-de 
civilisat~on' implying a more equal sharing of well-being and welfare, 
it serves ~o promote private rationality at the expense of global 
rationality. 6) 
3. Some implications of monopolisation and concentration 
It is generally recognised that the accelerated use of science in the 
making of new technology isilitimately connected with the concentration i,;_ 
and centralisation of capital in increasingly large corporations~ 
These corporations must rely on the continuous development of new 
products, as well as on the introduction of new (e.g. raw material 
substitution) production techniques, to ensure future growth and 
profitability. In as far as profitability is eroded by competition 
or diminished demand, new techniques and new products must be organised 
as old ones become and are made obsolete. 7) Such a process may be 
described as planned obsolescence. Thus, obsolescence producing 
innovation crucially relies on the expansion of applied science' and 
new technology. 
In the industrially advanced countries, the State, as a ruie, 
fulfils a vital role in the expansion of corporations, both by 
drawing upon and supplying the corporations with scientific and 
technological inputs. The objectives of the corporations tend to 
become equated with the requirements of national interest and progress. 8) 
This unification of public commitment and private interests plays a 
a major role in the bias of science and technology towards military 
uses. 9) The recent profitable transfers of nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes are onlr an offshoot of this, and the consequences 
may not necessarily be peaceful. 10) 
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Monopolisation of control over the. production of science and 
technology is an essential condition for corporations to minimize 
operational risks.and maximize profitability. It is, therefore, 
characteristic of multinational corporations to treat host countries 
as sourdes of production and profit, while trying to keep research 
and product development (as well as management policy and output 
decisions) centralised elsewhere, usually at their headquarters. 11) 
As a result,while the total stock of science and technology has 
increased enormously in recent years, it has become highly 
concentrated in the rich cotintries. Its. growth in volume has been 
virtually inversely proportional to its relevance for the dependent 
countries. 12) Even the minimal amount of research carried out in 
these countries is largely devoted to the problems and methods 
determined outside rather than by internal requirements. Since 
multinational corporations, as indicated earlier in this paper, 
naturally tend to concentrate on the production of goods for the high 
income. groups as this is most profitable, it follows. that there has 
been no incentive for them to develop and disseminate production 
techniques which can be used by the great masses of people without 
large and costly inputs of capital.· 13) . 
It has been observed that colonial domination during the past 
centuries has frequently led to the destruction of existing forms 
of production. In a number of cases these were, comparatively 
speaking, characterised by relatively superior forms of technology, 14) 
while the benefits of the imported technologies turned out to be 
beneficial only to the dominant classes, both local and. f0..EE?_!:@.~ The 
effect of the development of productive forces· was decidedly shaped 
by the nature of evolving productive relations. The historical effects 
of dependency have gradually magnified to such a point that at present 
there are good grounds to posit that the underdeveiopment and stagnation 
of an indigenous science and technology in the dependent countries is 
rooted in the indiscriminate imPortation of packages of capital-
technology-management and restrictions on the us·e of· trap.sferred 
knowledge a.nd practices, due to monopolistic conditions under which 
industrial technology is introduced. 
·Thus, a definite connection may be observed between the relative 
decline of local invention and innovation and the. growing concentration 
of research and development in the hands of the multinational 
corporations. 15) The idea that, in a way, there exists a kind of 
supermarket where countries can freely shop to select the type of 
technology appropriate to their needs must be discarded~ It has been 
recognised that the market for proprietary technology is highly 
imperfect and oligopolistic, 16) and that it entails multiple heavy 
costs for the countries concerned. If the prevailing trend continues, 
according to UNCTAD calculations, these costs will increase 20% per 
year, 17) and will become a major factor in further aggravating the 
balance of payment position of many countries. 
Apart from the direct costs 18) of transferring the commodity 
of technology in its various forms (e.g., the right to use patents, 
licences, process know-how, trademarks, and technical services, which 
studie·s have shown are usually more profitable to sell than 
capital investment itself), there are a wide range of other costs. 
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Among these should be counted the so-called indirect costs (e,.g. 
over-pricing imports of intermediate products and equipment, 
over-pricing imported technology related to the former"profits on 
capitalisation of know-how and a portion of repatriated profits 
of subsidiaries or joint ventures) ,which may be much more substantial 
than the direct costs. A third type of cost which is even more difficult 
to visualise or to calculate, are the real costs or foregone benefits, 
of the transfer of technology. These result from such limitations as 
are imposed by transfer arrangements, the transfer of unnecessary or 
inappropriate technology and the longterm influence of imported 
technology which deflects national policy from a sound development of 
national technological capabilities. Such limitations are quite 
varied and may involve restrictions on resource use, competition, 
exports, taxes,. local innovation, production, marketing, management 
as well as any other aspects of national and local productive and 
related activity. 
A major restriction to the free use of technology results from 
monopolistic control by foreign companies in dependent countries 
over patents of which they own nearly 90%. Rather than encouraging 
production, these patents are taken out to discourage it. The 
functions of intellectual property laws do not serve to protect against 
abuse but serve to promote the owners' interests. 19) Apart from the 
damaging effects of the transfer of inappropriate technology, the cost 
of the 'non-transfer' of technology also requires attention. That is, 
the transfer of technology for the sole or principal purpose of making 
use of the resource-endowment in a particular country. Among these 
may be included all those investments which have created in many countries 
an extractive enclave economy. These have produced mineral and 
agrjcultural materials which have served as inputs for the metropolitan 
economies, with pervasive disarticulating effects on balanced autonomous 
dev~lopment. 20) 
The purpose of locating the transfer of technology in historical 
context is not to moralise the issue but to make it intelligible. It 
may be relatively easy for countries, once the insight has matured, to 
conclude that it is a question of national survival to take appropriate 
measures to secure autonomous development. 21) Effective enforcement 
of such measures depends, however, on a highly complex set of 
interdependent forces. Among these are the country's economic resources, 
its international bargaining power, the degree of development of 
internal pressures for more even development, their effects on the 
internal political scene, the evolution towards effective solidarity 
at the regional and continental level, 22) and among producers of , 
particular products, as well as developments between the dominant countries. 
4. Some implications of scientific and technological dependence 
If technological independence is posited as a necessary condition for 
balanced national development, this in no way suggests that national 
autarky is desirable or feasible. It would, however, imply that 
people acquire substantially increased control over their own society 
and future. This presupposes the establishment of an effective capacity 
to adapt external pressures and interests to internal national 
requirements rather than the reverse. 
,.1 
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In this sense, technologicai independence is inseparabie from 
economic, political, social and cultural independence, all being 
interdependent. One way in which cultural dependence is revealed 
is in the uncritical acceptance of the world as it is structured and 
functions, and in taking the position that answers to the problems 
confronting the dependent countries can only be found by taking 
each issue separately. . 
Technological dependency is not only a problem for people in 
dependent countries, who. need - as a condition for their own 
emancipation - to develop an image of autonomous development 23) 
and to realise what action this requires tr0m them,. but it should be a 
basic concern for people in do~nant countries. They are confronted 
with the effects of this dependence by the production and consumption 
patterns in their own societies and, in fact, substantially benefit 
from this technological dependence which is only one dimension of 
the structure of uneven relations between rich and poor countries. 
If western technology, and its implied economic and social patterns 
are judged to be superior, and, therefore, western culture is held 
to be superior, 24) it is posited that such a view·is based on the 
interests and valuations of the dominant class(es). As indicated 
earlier~.they tend to equate economic growth and their consUmption 
patterns, however uneven and discriminating their effects may be 
on the mass of the population, with national interest and progress. 
One consequence of this position has been that training in 
science and technology has been entirely patterned on western approaches 
and preferences, while virtually no attention has been paid to the 
development of indigenous science and technology as part of th~ search 
for national and local attempts to answer their problems~ Another 
consequence has been the massive exodus of scientists and professionals 
to the rich countries where they enjoy higher incomes, more· stability 
and can work in accordance with the professional and cultural values 
and standards they adopted during their studies which often clash 
with those in their home environment. In as far as their home 
countries incur high costs in training professionals and scientists, 
such an exodus, in effect, constitut'es a substantial contribution by 
poor coUntries to th~ functioning of rich countries. To reverse this 
migratory movement, it is not enough to introduce more adapted and 
relevant forms of training. Nor can such an exodus only be ascribed 
to the inc;:orporation into·· foreign values· and life styles. What perhaps 
plays a more significant role is the overall situation in each 
country, whether scientists and professionals believe that their own 
societies have a future and whether conditions permit and stimulate 
them to serve their community. 
The development of such a perspective cannot be dissociated from 
whether or not there is a movement of society as a whole which 
encourages scientists and professionals to identify and associate with 
the lot of the majority of the population. The growth of such a process 
is, as a rule, closely connected with the growth of a national 
consciousness which is linked with a wider movement towards a national 
'prise de conscience' and defense of national interests, in response 
to the effects of de-nationalisation of resources. 
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If there is increasing concern that cultural values are being 
eroded by the rapid transformation in many countries, and if the 
preservation of such values is considered vital to people's 
wellbeing, 25) it needs to be emphasised that culture cannot be 
understood as a frozen residue carried over from the past, but that 
culture is always the living expression in people of the contradictions 
between a dominant and dependent mode of production within a particular 
social formation (society). If solidarity and sharing, as basic values 
which are desperately needed in all societies, are increasingly . 
emphasised, to insist on such values without insisting on the need for 
transformation of the dominant mode of production (rooted in the 
institutionalisation and promotion of self-interest) leads to 
moralisation which may confuse the nature of the problem. Such 
moralisation is likely to reduce the problem to the improvement of 
individual attitudes and morality. 
5. Technological growth: controlled transformation or 
inevitable compulsion 
It, thereby, implicitly bypasses the need for transforming the structure 
of social relations, as well as the institutions which sustain this 
structure and in which it is expressed. As has been suggested.above, 
science and technology have become an intrinsic part of the dominant 
productive forces and, so to say, carry the particular 'code' of the 
structure of productive relations of each society. 26) 
If private property of the resources and instruments of production, 
and also of the new forms in which it has emerged (e.g., .intellectual 
property such as licenses and patents), is a major factor in the non- . 
diffusion or distorted use of science, technology and traditional forms 
of capital, then the transformation of this institution must. be envisaged 
as a central task in the creation of new relations between and within 
societies, as well as in the creation of a new culture based on sharing, 
mutual exchange and affirmation. The more science becomes the driving 
force in today's world, the more urgent it becomes to transform the 
institutions and the culture of private property. It seems, indeed, 
that solutions to the problems of development, including those 
generated by the development of science and culture, cannot be found if 
science remains a private domain instead of becoming the patrimonium of 
all. 27) In other words, the scientific revolution requires a social 
revolution,' i.e., a transformation of productive relations and of 
consciousness and culture, so that inequality and uneven development 
are replaced by equality and an even spread of benefits. 28) 
The question arises whether the concentration and centralisation 
of science and technology, as manifest in the continuous scale 
enlargement of industrial enterprise, is an inevitable, inherent law 
of industrialisation required by the very development of productive 
forces or whether, far from being natural laws and inherent in 
technological expansion, they are in actual fact social 'laws' deriving 
from the dominant mode of production in which productive relations 
have primacy over productive forces. The answer to this question has far 
reaching implications. If it has to be accepted that concentration 
and centralisation are inherent natural laws, then the wholesale 
transfer of technologies from advanced industrialised countries to 
the dependent countries must be accepted without further question as 
an inevitable datum. 29) While it may be necessary to minimise or 
mitigate the possible side effects, the social costs will have to be 
faced as inevitable. 
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Among these costs are the previously described costs of centralising 
the surplus of the majority at the expens·e of their basic needs, so 
as to ensure concentrated accumulation, the non-utilisation or 
under-utilisation of their productive and creative potential, as 
well as the orientation of all training, education and· services· in 
function of such accumulation. It also implies· taki~gfor_grahted 
the build-up of a pronounced command and hierarchical structure and 
an excessive specialisation of labour required by such a production 
structure. Moreover, it assumes that uneven development between city 
and country, between industry and agriculture - and within these 
sectors - as well as the environmental d~ages and hazards involved 
in such concentration have to be accepted as given. 
One way of determining if we are faced with a dilemma between 
possible choices, or whether there is no dilemma at all as there 
is only one (technological) road to industrial advance and national 
deveiopment, is to examine the nature of development linkages and 
to find out whether these· are technologically determined or whether 
technological determinations are, in fact, institutionally and 
culturally defined. It has been alleged that 'all sectors of industry 
have their fixed recipes, in the main determined by technology, and 
that these recipes which prescribe the input coefficient matrix 
derived from the U.S. European input-output table represents a complete 
cookbook of modern technology which constitutes the structure of a 
fully developed economy and which all countries will have to follow 
if they wish to develop. An underdeveloped economy is then, as a 
consequence, defined as underdeveloped to the extent that it lacks 
the working part of this system. The . process of development consists .. 
essentially in the installation and building of an approximqtion of 
the system embodied in the advanced countries of the United States and 
Western Europe, and more recently of the U.S.S.R. - with due 
allowance for limitations imposed by the local mix of resources and 
the availability to exploit them. 30) 
Such a position excludes any choice or flexibility for dependent 
countries to pursue a path adapted to their specific needs. Any 
conception of variance is thus blocked by the rigid determination 
of technology. All that is left is to adhere toa standard industrial 
structure and to accept as inescapable the technological prescriptions 
developed in the industrially advanced countries. Such a view of the 
role of technology in development completely bypasses the fact that 
the industrial structures presently characterising the world have, 
in no way, been ready-made prescriptions handed over from the past 
to present generations. On the contrary, they are specific results 
of accumulative transformations of and in the political, social and 
economic order and, therefore, are not technologically but 
institutionally 31) and culturally determined. If it is accepted 
that the main economic parameters for the choice of techniques are the 
requirements of capital accumulation, the structure and pattern of 
demand of intermediate and final consumer goods, the real wage 
rates, the availability and price of investment resources and of raw 
materials, 32) it must be admitted that these are not simply and 
purely 'economic' magnitudes. Rather, they are entirely shaped by the 
particular forms of social organisation, which are the changing 
outcome of specific historical movements. 
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Thus the market and distribution mechanisms characterising the various 
types of social organisation are then principal determinants of the 
choice of technology- which, therefore, cannot be explained in itself. 
These parameters are thus shaped by particular social forces which bring 
about specific dominant modes of production, and the:tr transformation. 33) 
• . , I 
The assumption that technological choices are strictly pre-determined 
conceals, therefore, another implicit premise: the invariance and 
identity of demand structure and patterns in 'developing' countries 
with those in 'developed' countries. The fact that similar patterns 
of 'effective demand' evolve in dependent countries does not in any 
way suggest fixed regularities in human .needs. What it does indicate 
is that the higher income groups actually acquire a pattern of 
consumption which, in as far as it is conspicuous and pertains to 
durable consumer goods which are individually accumulated, is identical 
with that in the industrially advanced countries. 34) 
It is obvious that these patterns of effective demand do not 
respond to any 'innate' or 'natural' needs, but that they are moulded 
by the desire to imitate the dominant values and life style of the 
technologically advanced countries. In reality, these patterns are 
shaped by the productive structure which multiplies the want for a 
continuously more diversified package of individually acquired goods 
in order to maximise profits. Rather than assuming consumer sovereignty, 
there are good grounds to assume producer sovereignty. Under monopolistic 
conditions, this is founded on instilling in consumers a sense'of 
permanent dissatisfaction. This motive of advertising, in this context, 
is to convince consumers that there can be no happiness (i.e. the 
good life), and that they fail to 'progress' and keep pace, unless they 
satisfy these artificially induced needs. 35) This. follows from the 
inherent dynamics of a polarised, monopolistic market and class society 
in which 'personal happiness' is equated with individual accumulation 
and wealth. 
There are usually various alternatives open in regard to the 
input mix for manufacturing products catering to final demand. Thus 
construction, infra-structure, transportation, automobiles, furniture, 
clothing and food can be produced with a great variety of-input mixes, 
some of which will require much more capital and technology than others. 36) 
As has been stressed above, increasingly diversified product development 
and differentiation, the preference for capital intensive techniques 
as well as a limited group of high-income clients representing 'effective' 
demand, both require and rely on a monopolistic market and their mutual 
reinforcement. As a consequence, . what is more profitable is produced, 
and what is more expensive (fashionable, modern, prestigious) will 
be sought. 
Rather than considering economies of scale as inherent in technology, 
there is good reason to assume that in many ways they are determined by 
the profitability which firms pursue. These require particular combinations 
of technological inputs, given the costs of the development of new 
technology and products, as well as those of marketing, and the 
objective of transferring these profits abroad for accumulation or 
other profitable purposes. 37) 
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;rt has l;ui!:ru:;.,generally taken for. granted that .tn.the production of 
intermediate goods such as steel, cement and chemicals (e.g • 
. fertiliser) there "is a relatively high degree of rigidity as to the 
scale of production and the use of technology, and that this' . 
requires' a high degree of centralisation and concentration. There 
is also, however,evidence that what is rational and efficient 
in this field is not, in the first instance, determined by 
technological compulsion but by the constraints imposed by the 
nature and size ,of the market and the search for minimising costs 
and maximising profitability. 38) The possibility for a !lew 
decentralised small and middle-sized pattern of producing basic 
inputs and capital goods may be favoured by such factors as the 
weakness of transportation facilities and the dispersion of mineral 
and power resources. 39) ·More decisive, however, appears to be the 
political and economic organisation which makes it possible to 
bypass the technological compulsions imposed by the dominant mode of 
production. 40) 
It may well be that governments concentrate capital and 
technology in basic industries on the premise that these investments 
will have strong linkage effects, and that the growth of the national 
economy will in the long rUn decisively depend on capital formation 
generated by these investments. While such a·view may be valid.in 
abstracto, in practice such inv~stments tend to adapt ·themselves to 
the requir~ments of capital intermediate and consumption goods 
responding to the demand pattern of the higher income minority. As a 
result, although such investments may produce rapid growth, their 
linkage effects are minimal or even negative. 41) Thus, what 'should' 
be pro,duced from the point of view of national development is not 
produced, while what is produced 'should' not be produced. This 
brings us back to the questions of which ihvestment decisions are 
taken, by whom,for what reasons and what is the resulting pattern 
of resource utilisation. The answers to these questions are 
inextricably bound up with the issue of how incomes are generated 
and distributed and the resulting patterns of effective· demand 
(which are determined by, among other factors, the rate of real 
wages and the access to investment resources and possibilities) • 
6. Pressures for technological expansion and the need 
for planned production 
It has been observed above that the State plays a crucial role in 
promoting technologically intensive patterns of investment in the 
production of goods which do not respond to majority needs, and that 
it is the comparativeiy high profit margins derived from the State's 
support to monopolistic practices which destroy, or prevent from 
developing, other investment and production patterns more suited to. 
majority needs (in terms of basic goods and services, work and 
income). A wide array of devices to cheapen the cost of capital goods, 
and to facilitate their rapid replacement (e.g. by special depreciation 
allowances), combine to favour the introduction of unsuitable 
technology. Capital intensive enterprises permit this reduction of the 
labour input. Although the smaller but more highly skilled. labour 
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force in such enterprises may receive relatively higher wages than 
do the workers in the traditional enterprises or those which are 
kept traditional, the informal sector,. and have low productivity, 
hi'gher.wages may well become a reason for the profit seeking 
entrepreneur tofurther increase capital intensive technology. 42) 
Thus~ the pressure of organised labour to ensure a more adequate 
share of the firm's income may boomerang - their own work in the 
creation of capital increases their vulnerability. This may trigger 
demands for increased wages in less productive enterprises, which 
then may also seek increased mechanisation. Such claims for wage 
increases by the working population may well be inspired for the very 
unequal existing income structure (e.g. the relatively high salaries 
in the bureaucracy inherited from the colonial period), ·as well as . 
by the government's pressure to diminish this inequality in order to 
gain political support from part of the working populati·on. 43) At 
the root of such rounds of wage increases, therefore, are prior 
unequal income structures. In as far as such equalisation tendencies 
drive the already established high income groups to assert their 
privileged position, and to realise it in terms of achieving still 
higher incomes and expand their conspicuous consumption, this may 
generate further pressures to further expand technologically 
intensive industry, at the expense of existing indigenous 'home-born' 
(medium and small scale) industries. The latter are expected to 
absorb the rapidly growing labour force which can nb longer find 
employment in the modern sector. At the same time, these industri·es 
are lacking the means. to grow, often as a result of discriminatory 
treatment which may be extension of discriminatory laws and 
practices established before political independence. 44) 
It might be argued that surplus maximising types of 
technology, in spite of being technology intensive and. creating 
little new employment in the short run, ensure a maximum growth of 
output and are also likely, in the longer run, to permit a steady 
expansion of employment. Such an argument may be applicable if and 
when surpluses are fully and systematically re-invested. This· 
presupposes, however, that there is control over surplus and that 
investment of surplus is subject to planning in the interests of 
society as a whole. This implies a planned economy either directed 
by the State and/or based on agreements for planned production between 
production units controlled by associations of direct producers (the 
working population). 45) This assumes full reliance on the active 
cooperation of the population through decentralisation and the 
creation of a new consciousness and culture which inspire them to 
carry out their productive activities to benefit the community as 
a whole. In most dependent countries, due to the dominant mode of 
production and the social forces which direct it from both outside 
and within, large portions of the surplus are, as observed earlier, 
either transferred abroad or unproductively invested or consumed.' 
In such cases, the linkage effects of investments are minimal, and in 
many ways are negative. 
) 
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7. The scope'and feasibility of intermediate technology 
One approach to counteract. the negative effects. of uneven' development 
and of capital and technology intensive patterns of investment and 
concentration has been to introduce what has been termed 'intermediate 
technology'. The original proposal for the spread of intermediate 
technology is based on several premises, such as: 
'that work-places have to be created in the areas where the 
people are living now, and not primarily in metropolitan 
areas into which they tend to migrate, that these work-places 
must be, on the average, cheap enough so that they can be 
created in large numbers without this calling for an 
unattainable level of savings and imports, that the' 
production methods employed must be relatively simple, so 
that the demands for high skills are minimised, not only 
in the production process itself, but also in matters of 
organisation, raw materials supply, financing, marketing and 
so forth, and that production should be largely from local 
materials for local use.' 
The types of industry to be tackled immediately would be 'every kind 
of consumers' goods industry, including building materials, 
agricultural implements and equipment for intermediate technology' 
while it is assumed that genuine economic development can only take 
place in as far as 'people are able to make their own tools and 
other equipment'. 46) 
These premises unquestionably strike the heart of the problem. 
However, relating the proposals on intermediate technology to the 
concrete historical setting of the dependent countries would reveal 
that the very productive activities which intermediate technology 
wishes to bring about were in the colonial past and are at present 
challenged by the massive influx of consumer goods from abroad and, 
at a more ~ecentstage, by the development of import substitution 
industries •. AS is known the establishment of import substitution 
industries, with the help of the state, has been and frequently is 
at the expense of the informal sector and the development of small 
and medium scale enterprises. This process has taken place 
simultaneously with the development of a class and income structure 
which, as observed above, gears investment and State support into 
directions preventing the effective activation of the productive 
and creative capacity of the majority population. Thus, proposals 
for intermediate technology stand in direct conflict with the 
allocation of resources and investment patterns responding to the 
interests of the dominant classes and associated groups. 47) Its 
realisation would require, among other things, strict control over 
foreign and associated investments, over patterns of consumption, 
(in particular, conspicuous consumption) and a re-orientation·towards 
the production of services and goods - capital goods as well as the 
consumer goods which the mass of the population needs to live 
reasonably and to become motivated to produce. 
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There are no a p~iori reasops to exclude the possibility that 
governments may develop the political will.to re-orient production 
and consumption patterns in this direction. It is likely, however, 
that they will be confronted with powerful opposition from vested 
interests. The vigour of this opposition can be expected to be 
directly proportional to the determination of a government t6 carry 
out such a policy. If such (populist) governments realise that they 
are challenged, they are faced with a dilemma. They either give in, 
or create a firmer basis for their policies by attempting to introduce 
structural reforms such as control over foreign trade, banking and 
credit, profit and price control, agrarian reform and reform of the 
market system. The realisation of these reforms will depend on the 
balance of political forces and whether sufficient, effective, broad-
based support is forthcoming or can be mustered. 
The implementation of such reforms, however; does not guarantee· 
that the suggested pattern of production and consumption will come 
about. This will depend on whether the newly emerging groups mobilise 
sufficient political pressure on the government to re-orient these 
patterns and whether these groups achieve sufficiently strong direct 
forms of. democratic control and participation. If reforms are 
intended or lead to politically demobilise the newly emerging groups 
and do not progressively rely on the mobilisation of political,. 
social and economic power from below and from within (i.e. where 
people live and work), no significant re-orientation can be expected. 
It has been argued that not only in industrial production but also 
in infra-structure and agricultural production there is a wide range 
of options in the mix of technology and labour. 48) While inputs 
and services for the establishment of a social and economic infra-
structure in the larger urban centres tend to be capital intensive 
through the organised capital market, this is less so in the rural 
areas where self-financing and self-provisioning playa major role. 
Therefore, by slowing down migration to and population growth in the 
large urban centres, saving for such investments maybe enhanced. 49) 
This proposition too easily ignores however the concrete social and 
economic conditions of most of the rural population. Their 
circumstances are frequently such that they have only limited 
incentives to work hard and to invest for themselves. Why should 
they work hard if a substantial share of their social product is 
taken away from them directly or through unfavourable terms of trade? 
In agriculture, husbandry and land use there also appears to 
be a broad range of options between capital-intensive and other forms 
of investment. While in the initial stage the 'green revolution' may 
lead to increased labour inputs, successive rounds of mechanisation 
due to the impulse of market forces and profit maximisation are 
likely to be more capital and technology intensive and to reduce the 
need for labour. The unhesitating application of technological 
modernisation to agriculture was, until recently, legitimised by the 
thesis that land-labour ratios were by and large a fixed datum, and 
that in the more densely populated areas the marginal productivity 
of labour would approximate zero. 
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This proposition served to justify equating agricultural modernisation -
irrespective of its effects - with development, and wholly bypassed 
the potential capacity of the rural masses to increase productivity 
by intensifying their work and expand production by diversifying 
their activities. 50) 
It would require a great deal of imagination to associate the 
interest of the working population with the need for their labour in 
terms of marginal returns and profits. Their first interest, surely, 
would be to have food, enjoy security and the other conditions which 
make life livable and provide a prospect of a better future. The 
view of a fixed ratio between land and labour takes the prevailing 
land tenure system as an inflexible technical datum, disregarding 
that such a system always expresses the specific nature and structure 
of social relations concerning the control and the use of land and 
water as resources, and that it also determines the particular use 
and combination of technological inputs in the wider context of 
resource allocation. It is this inevitable bias, which considers 
labour only an input to be dispensed with if it is no longer 
'rational' and 'efficient' from the point of view of the individual 
enterprise, that leads to favour capital and technologically intensive 
forms of production. This is facilitated by the cheap availability of 
capital goods and technological inputs, lobbied for by entrepreneurs 
and promoted by government. 
8. The interrelationship between mode of production and mechanisation 
This is not an attempt to argue against mechanisation but to point out 
that the effects of mechanisation are very different and even opposite, 
depending on the mode of production in which it is introduced. If and 
when mechanisation is rapidly introduced and expanded in a market 
economy with a dense rural population, it tends to lead to expel 
small holders from the market. It may also lead to the eviction of 
tenants and the dismissal of labourers, thus increasing the non- .. 
or under-utilisation of the rural population. This situation would change 
radically if people are the joint owners of land and equipment. Instead 
of being. a threat to their survival and security, mechanism then becomes 
a powerful asset to the development of all, just as any other element 
of modernisation. 
In peak periods, mechanism can help overcome labour shortages 
and diminish the~ interruption of other productive activities. It may 
increase total output, as well as output per worker, by speeding up 
the process of cultivation and harvesting so that multiple cropping 
becomes possible thereby creating demand for additional labour. The 
labour thus saved becomes available for other activities in agriculture, 
industry, services and a variety of activities in the field of social 
and economic capital formation. Thus, the negative effects of 
mechanisation as they are now visible in agricultural modernisation 
in many dependent countries, point to conditions under which it may 
become a positive factor. Both the optimisation of opportunities for 
productive and creative manual work (potential surplus) and the 
ensuring of benefits of modernisation and mechanisation for the rural 
working population at large cannot occur without radical transformation 
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of productive relations. Joint ownership of land and equipment seem 
an indispen::;able technical condition. 
Mechanisation is a·crucial instrument in diminishing the gap 
between urban and rural life. Apart from its labour saving ~mplications, 
it is essential to reduce the·ofte~·back-breaking work on·the land. The 
reduction of such toil to make· life. in. the rural areas more. attractive 
should not be.considered merely an incidental by-product, but as 
worthwhile in itself. Apart from this criterion, mechanisation may 
be pursued as it makes work more productive and manual work has to 
be reduced as it becomes too expensive in terms bf comparative costs 
and benefits when the need for new productive activities arises. To· 
prevent the automatic operation of the 'law' that high technology 
drives out low technology, applicable to situations in which private 
profitability predominates, it is necessary that the mixing of 
manual work and mechanisation, as well as the phasing of the mix, be 
made subject to the conscious and democratic control of the working 
population. In this way a judicious balance can be achieved between 
advance in mechanisation and more labour. intensive forms of productive 
activity. The balance between the two is likely to change continuously 
with the· expansion of production and the growth of. productivity, as 
well as with the advance in social development as this creates new 
needs and modifies priorities. 
This control. of the balance between technology and physical work 
applies to all types of activity undertaken by the working population 
to enhance capital formation. In the initial stages much of the work 
may have to be done by manual labour with the assistance of available 
rudimentary equipment. With the increase :i:n accumulation and.the 
development of both industry and agriculture, the labour supply may 
become less abundant and shortages may even develop. At this stage, 
more equipment can and has to be used, and more can be achieved in 
less time. Moreover, as greater yields are achieved on less land, 
production can. be diversified. This description of a possible evolution 
of productive activity is quite contrary to the generally observed 
trend as it presupposes the possibility for the working population to 
rely on internal accumulation.so as to both invest and improve its 
social.condition. It cannot take place·unless there is a reasonable 
measure of security for people to dispose of and enjoy the wealth 
they create. 
9. Capital vs. labour intensive production: contradiction 
or complementarity 
The above analysis touches upon the much discussed issue regarding· 
the relationship between capital and labour intensive techniques 
of production. It is often assUmed that in a number of ways their 
use is mutually exclusive, and that it should be closely tied to a 
country's particular 'stage' of development. Thus, particular factor 
endowments would prescribe which alternative should be chosen. The 
greater the scarcity of capital and the abundance of labour, the 
mOre a country shouldreiy on labour intensive techniques, with the 
primary aim of maximising employment, so the argument goes. The 
opposite alternative is to concentrate capital and technology in 
order to ensure high productivity and rapid growth. 
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The consequence of rigorously applying the first alternative would 
be for a cOUnt~y to be condemned to 'low productivity and 
accumulation, and any long term growth poliqy would be out of the 
question. The application of labour intensive low productivity 
techniques has no merit in itself, although the maximum utilisation 
of an abundant labour force in a country with scarcity of capital 
may be a necessary starting point for development, if it wishes to 
avoid reliance on fo~eign assistance and thereby. increasingly jeopardises 
its autonomy. . 
The scope for capital formation by relying on intensive labour 
utilisation fora wide variety of productive projects has long been 
recognised. 51) What has not been admitted, however, is that optimum 
rates.of accumulation are in no way identical to maximum rates of 
accumulation, and that people's creative and productive power can only 
be fully mobilised if they acquire, as insisted upon earlier, their 
proportional share in both accumulation and productive consumption. 
This implies the reduction of unproductive investment and consumption 
or, in other words, a transformation of soci.al relations between the 
working population and those who control their work and the fruits 
thereof. Uneven development, through the use of technologically 
intensive procedures, is the unavoidable consequence of bypassing 
the immense reservoir of under-utilised labour. If the bulk of the 
population, in the dominant view, is considered useless at the 
moment that .more profitable ways of surplus creation become 
available to· entrepreneurs,' 'entrepreneurial ii:titiative' arid' reliance 
on such methods are proposed as 'the ·only way'. 
If all-out priority is given to the application of capital 
intensive techniques in the dynamic sector, namely industry, then it 
is unavoidable that this will lead to the creation or intensification 
of ~alance~ between the rural areas and agriculture on the one hand 
and the urban centres and industry on the' other hand. In actual 
practice, the choice between capital and labour intensive forms of 
production does not exist in an economy based on commodity exchange. 
The increasing call for the use of labour intensive techniques manifests 
a belated concern with the marginalising consequences of .the lopsided 
development of the modern industrial s'ector as well as the marginalising 
effects of recent agricultural growth policies. It is frequently not 
so much inspired by an authentic concern for the wellbeing and welfare 
of the masses as well by the awareness that it can serve to .stave off 
pressures for the overturn of prevailing productive relations' and 
to secure a measure of stability. 
If a plea is now made to concentrate on labour :intensive techniques, 
it is rarely accompanied by the recognition that the marginalisation 
and stagnation provoking the proposals for labour intensive techniques 
is rooted in the uncontrolled, unplanned growth of the modern sector. 
Instead of supporting the development of the 'traditional' agricultural 
sector by raising its productive capacity so as to augment the surplus 
for re-investment, this growth blocks its expansion, while frequently 
extracting, and making use of the surplus generated by ~t. It is, 
therefore, suggested that no meaningful discussion of the desirability 
and usefulness of capital intensive versus labour intensive techniques 
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can be carried out without investigati:ng the concrete terms of the 
relationship between the modern and the traditional sector as well 
as the nature of each of these with regard to the rules governing 
the distribution of the social product between accumulation/investment 
and consumption. 
It is proposed that neither a one-sided.reliance on labour 
intensive nor on capital intensive techniques is a promising way 
to achieve autonomous dynamic development. What is called for is a 
combination of the two, taking into account the factor endowment of 
the country at its particular stage of development, as well as the 
need for increasing productivity and laying the foundation .for long 
term groWth. A widely spread increase in productivity must be 
simultaneously promoted with the creation of work and of a reasonable 
income for the whole population. 52) Traditional techniques and 
skills may well have to serve as a point of departure for raising 
productivity, and every effort must be made to modernise the available 
skills and technology. This does not preclude the organisation of a 
modern, significantly more productive sector. On the contrary, the 
build-up of such a sector to produce basic inputs, capital and consumer 
goods is indispensable to activate the traditional sector in its 
attempt to advance and raise productivity. However, this would be 
conditioned by the dynamic advance of this traditional sector which 
provides the basis for its own accumulation. 
Thus, the correct approach may be to combine the existing fund 
of science, technology and skills with innovative modern approaches, 
and generalise the application of more advanced science and 
technology so that the level and quality of overall productive 
activity is continuously raised. This presupposes, once again, a 
radical transformation of productive relations which would permit 
the widespread, active involvement of the entire population in learning 
and experimentation. It has been observed that the most fruitful 
periods of scientific advance were those in which the class barrier 
was at least partially broken down and a close relationship developed 
between practical activity and theoretical analysis. 53) Thus, it 
seems that only when a scientific revolution is combined with social 
transformation does the possibility arise that fundamental and applied 
scientific research are oriented towards the real problems of a country_ 
At present, this implies a consciously planned state policy 
regarding the choice and use of techniques and technology. 54) But 
such a policy only bears fruit if there is a ·structure de reception· 
for it. This not only requires preventing or aboiishing the 
monopolisation of resources and their mobilisation, as well as new 
practices of democratised surplus appropriation and control, but also 
the organisation of the population in a way which enhances its 
motivation. The optimum involvement of the population in· seeking 
imaginative answers to local problems, and the possibility of 
developing indigenous abilities and creative capacity, is unavoidably 
linked to the de-monopolisation of .the control and use of science. 55) 
'-, 
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10. Scrence and, tecruloTogy: -- ;i.nsti'umenEs 'of subordin-atlon 
or of de"elopl1lent 
The development of science implies its institutionalisation. If this 
institutionalisation leads to the acquired fund of insight and 
knowledge being mechanistically transmitted and applied, it follows 
that ,it cannot bring about human development, as this requires the 
creative assimilation of existing knowledge and know-how, as well 
as the discovery of new knowledge and practical ways of responding 
to concrete challenges. A linear vision of progress necessarily 
entails the imposition of established procedures. While these may 
be effective in certain contexts, they may not be relevant in other 
contexts. Such an imposition of particular forms of technology and 
applied science precludes the development of scientific attitudes 
and methods among those who are the recipients of ready made formulas. 
Thus, the basic function of science (a growing process, instead of 
a fixed thing), 56) as a method of constantly questioning the fund 
of existing knowledge and practices, and of searching for new ideas 
and practices more adequately responding to people' 's needs and 
aspirations, may be jeopardised. 57) , 
In this context, for people of a nation or of a community, 
development may mean, above all, the capacity to identify their true 
problems and to formulate methods of solving them. 58)' It is useful 
to remember that in the initial stages of the industrial revolution 
in the West the multiple, small-scale technical innovations were not 
the determinant of economic development but, on the ,contrary, it was 
the bottlenecks caused by the rise in demand which made a break through 
in productive forces necessary, thus favouring the search for practical 
answers. It was only at a much later st,age that science and the 
development of techniques became major determinants of economic 
development. 59) 
With the present concentration of science and technology in the 
world, the challenge for the dependent countries is to create the 
conditions under which they will be able to develop their own science 
and technology in response to their national requirements, and to use 
the, fund'of established science and technology in a selective' and'creative 
way so that; rather than being a liability - blocking autonomous, 
balanced development - they promote it. There is undoubtedly a close 
link between the ways in which accumulation takes place and is 
promoted in a country, and the possibilities for people to be 
encouraged to acquire scientific attitudes and to learn by doing 
(making a virtue of necessity). If and when accumulation is primarily 
viewed as the concentration of capital and technology in a few 
production centres, then involvement in science and technology 
necessarily becomes the privilege of specialised elites. 
If, on the contrary, reliance is placed on the widest possible 
multiplication of initiatives~ this would also entail alternative 
patterns of accumulation and of the development of science and technology. 
New perceptions regarding accumulation, and how it can take place, l:!equire 
new approaches to linking productive activities and sectors. 
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Attempts are therefore required to analyse alternative approaches, 
and to develop through practice proposals regarding how productive 
activities and linkages can be ~rganised in view of both . 
accumulation and social development so. that the effects will be 
unifying rather than dividing. A basic premise is that a coUntry will 
mainly rely t:or lts development on its own reSources and mobilising 
capacity, and that planned use will be made of the surplus which is 
generated, in.response to the needs of the majority population. 
11. Final Observations 
One effect of incorporating the. I modernised I parts of dependent 
societies into the capitalist mode of production on a world scale 
is the intensification of uneven d~velopment between and within the 
industrial and agricultural se'ctors and the weakening of the prospects 
for development of cooperation and complementaritie's between societies, 
which for most of them is a requirement for autonomous development. 60) 
The search for joint action and the defense of common interests by 
the Third World countries is promoted by the attempts to prevent 
them and to break up efforts in that direction. Measures such as the 
American International Trade Bill of January 1975 designed to -
protect the internal market, are basically intended to maintain'the 
status quo and to prevent the Third World countries from bringing about 
a change in the balance ot: power. Rather than leading to stability, 
such measures are likely to. intensify contradictlons and to press 
Third World countries to seek ways to overcome the atomising and 
fragmenting effects of a'divide'et'iIilpera policy. Inasfar as ruling 
classes in Third World countries accept the continued dependent . 
incorporation into the I free I world market system, implying increasing 
marginalisation of the masses as a result of intensified uneven 
development (which is a major cause of famine or threat of famine in 
several countries), or these classes reserve for themselves a major 
share of the benefits resulting from successful pressure to modify 
the balance of power, they prepare the ground for their own overthrow 
and the development of a social revolution which will be pressed by 
the masses out of sheer practical necessity and the need of which has 
long been recognised. 61) Profound transformation of social and 
productive relations becomes ever more urgent and is enhanced by the 
pursuit in all countries of a mutually reinforcing process of 
accelerated capital accumulation and conspicuous consumption. 62) 
Thus, the ideal of a more human society, rooted in mutual support, 
equality and solidarity, will be realised as it comes to respond to 
the necessity for human survival and .secure conditions for self-
realisation by people and peoples. 
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(Man and Land, the Fundamental Relationship) critique on the 
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and their emphasiS on a dynamic conception of labour utilisation. 
51. A major break with the 'one-sided emphasis on growth through 
capital came in the beginning of the fifties from Ragnard Nurkse 
in his Problems of Capital Formation" in Underdeveloped Countries, 
Blackwell, Oxford, 1953. Nurkse failed however to recognise the 
interdependence (and relative identity) of production and 
consumption and to perceive increased consumption" (by the masses 
in reward and in exchange for their work) as an essential 
condition to increaSed" production 'and productivity. As Mandel 
argues in hi::; Marxist Economic Theory, p.620,'Mobilisation of 
millions of peasants for regular work which upsets,their ancestral 
customs demands the presence of a political and/or social force able 
to mobilise them, which is capable of obtaining this effort from 
the ~easants willingly'. 
He rightly points to the ineffectiveness and,wastefulness of 
harnessing potential capital formation by means of force. Not 
only overt but eve!ll more so indirect concealed forms of' forced 
labour need be stressed if attention is drawn to the fa:tlu~eof 
increasing productivity and of creating an environment in which 
commitment, interest and creativity can flourish. 
See also Gunnar Myrdal. His approach to the question of diSCipline 
appears essentially mora1istic as he emphasises the need for 
disciplin~ 'in all strata' and even the villages without perceiving 
the rationality of the privileged group of supporting a 'soft' 
St(;l.te which protects and promotes its position and on t1:;te other 
hand the rationality of silent protest by the poor villagers, 
manifest in their lack of commitment and cooperation in Government 
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groups. Asian Drama, the chapter on Concepts and Practice of 
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stagnation resulting from it. Such a link between the contribution 
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is clearly formulated by Erich Jacoby, Ope cit., p.59. After having 
pointed to the relative failure of public works programmes through 
popular participation, Jacoby observes: 'There is no doubt that 
idle agricultural labour in the underdeveloped countries could be 
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socio-economique au Nord Vietnam', Civilisations, No.ll, 1972. 
The policy to combine old and new, the traditional and the modern, 
the less and more advanced, high productivity and low productivity 
techniques is characteristic of the North Vietnamese development 
strategy. 
Apart from the need to turn necessity into virtue and make an 
optimal use of the latent potentialities in creative and 
productive capacities in people which can be organised and step 
by step raised thanks to the identification of people with the 
overall orientation promoted by the leadership and state (a 
process which is not even but characterised by continuous and 
inevitable contradictions), there are however also, 'technicai' 
arguments for paying full attention to and draw upon the 
mobilisation of the small scale, less advanced units and forms 
of production~ Maurice Dobb has formulated two theoretical 
criteria under which the choice of lower capital intensity._ would 
r.!:otbe prejudicial to the objective of maximum growth (assuming that 
maximum growth for courifrTes wi tli a~-lo~ilevel of ...... devEilopmeiit -'6f 
productive forces 'and low levels of welfare is a'leg.:LtiInateand 
necessary objective):'--' - , -, ,,', ',-, -
1. Where a lower capital in.tensity, when' combined wiclia-smalter 
scale I leads to a~.horter gestati..c:in--pe:t:'j..Qdf.9:r iIl)i'~~~~Iii: _ 9-nc;i, 
hence, makes it-possible to reinvest surplus accruing from the 
i:p.vestment earlier (a 'compound' eff~ct). The amount of surplus 
per u~it of capitalinvestmentmay;b~ smaller but- the compouhd 
effect could lead to a higher rate of growth. 
2. Where additional employment of labour force .does- not involve 
any additional claim upon the investment fu~ds of the economy. 
These criteria formulated by Dobb in An essay, on Economic Growth 
,and Planning, ,(Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1960) I are cited 
by Shi~erua Ishikawa in his Note on the Choice of Technology in China',op.ci~ 
Both the Chinese and Vietnamese strategy of walking on,two 
legs need therefore not only be interpreted in terms of making 
a virtue out of necessity. They have advantages in a more restricted 
sense. The debate about choice of techniques and comparative 
advantages and merits of the various avenues of action in .order 
to be fruitful and meaningful cannot be carried on in 'dissociation 
from the specific concrete dynamics and context of each society and 
the specific resources and potentialities of it. There are 
,considerations of a political nature (need for autonomous independent 
self-reliant development) as well as those concerning the ,nature of 
the new society to be created which are in no way touched in the 
above considerations and of which the overall effects by far exceed 
the technical considerations with regard to the 'compound' effects 
in a more restricted technical sense. 
53. J.D. Bernal, OPe cit., Vol. I, p.50. 
54. Ignacy Sachs, La Decouverte du Tiers Monde, Flammarion, Paris, 1971, 
p.244. After having stressed the necessity for the countries of the 
Third World to protect the development of science and industry in 
function of their own requirements; Sachs goes on to say: 'Non certes 
que nous croyions a une sorte de redemption par la science, ou a 
la possibilite de remplacer la transformation sociale par la 
revolution scientifique, Repetons-le, il ne peut s'agir que de 
complementarites. Et encore faut-il l'economie utilise a plein les 
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possibilites ouvertes par la science. Cela implique une 
orientation de la recherche fondamentale a appliquee,vers les 
problemes reels du pays et la promotion de choix des techniques 
au rang d'une veritable politique d'Etat'. 
55. See Ivan Illich, Tools for Conviviality, Calder and Boyars, 
London, 1973. The approach of Illich is a highly idealistic one;. 
While he acknowledges that planning for aconviviai society is 
a political process, his approach remains one-sidedly normative 
in that he implicitly assumes that somehow the rationality of 
his proposals will be recognised in view of the increasing need 
for self-preservation by the human species. It would seem that 
he underestimates the organic link between the requirements of 
the productive structure, as driven by the inherent pressures 
for accumulation in the capitalist mode_of production, and the 
defense of rationality of the evolving 'order', propelled by 
these forces. The result is that he devotes minor attention to 
the nature of the underlying contradictions which become manifest 
in the conflict which he describes as man's alienation and 
subordination to the tools of his society. Thus he devotes hardly 
any attention to the organic relation between t~e structure of 
productive relations and the development of productive forces and its 
manifestation in the dynamics of the social and class structure as 
well as in conflicts between dominant and competing values. 
This is not (to dis"tract fromth~-"gre~t~~~i.t"of"Iii:i.~h-~-~ 
work or to contest the thesis he presents in an original and 
creative way: that man's tools reach a point beyond which he loses 
control over them and they start to t~e hold of him. Also, if 
it is recognised that man's alienation is shaped in a class-
structured society by the absence of social control over work and 
the conditions of work, and the negation of the dialectical 
relationship between the development of productive relations and 
productive forces (primacy being given to the latter of which 
the former is supposed to be the one-sided expression-and 
automatic result), this does not diminish the urgent task of 
investigating the nature of alienating labour and its degrading 
consequences for human self-development and self-realisation. 
Both in practice of the capitalist mode of production and in the 
practice of bureaucratic state capitalism in which profitability 
and economic growth have been overriding 'natural' assumptions, 
one-sided concern with the expansion of productive forces (with as 
an implicit consequence the pursuit of centralised accumulation, 
concentration.,·and econc)Inies. of scale) have led to the ideology 
of the 'inevi tabili ty' 9l f Technological -ip!t'Qg:ress" the ~~~~~xti tant 
socialisation into the acceptance of inherent technological~.­
compulsions, and the subordination of people to the requirements 
of the economic system concealed beneath. This has been the ideology 
of capital as a thing and not as a social relationship and the 
negation of people as the source of all creativity and productivity 
(see 'On the pseudo-theory of the primacy of productive forces', 
Peking Review, 10 September 1971). 
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The economic philosphy of the Bolsjevik Party, reflected in 
Stalin's r.elentless pursuit of maximising growth (the search for 
equality was to him a petit~ourgeois concern) can be traced to 
the acceptance of the dominant views in the German Social 
Democratic Party, the distorted undialectical 'Marxist' gconomic 
conceptions of Ki:l.Utsky and his Harmony Model, which. impiied the 
subordination of the working populatic::m to the ' q:bj ecti ve ' 
requirements of capital. The Soviet.Thesis that class 
contradictions have been overcome, as the state on behalf of the 
working people has taken control of the means of production,· 
bypasse~ the reality that State and Government Party are themselves 
always expressions of contradictions in society. 
Changesdn;~the·>leg9-l form of property are sUbstituted for the 
(process towards) real and direct appropriation by the working 
people·of the fruits of their own work and control over their 
environment (see Charles Bettelheim, La L.utte De Classes. Dans 
Le URS.S, ~919-1923, Maspers, Paris, 1974). The thesis on 
convergence of the Soviet and Capitalist modes of production, 
welcomed by some reputed western economists, seems to bypass the 
fact that the disintegration of a socialist mode of production 
in the Soviet Union and the development of a ruling class and 
of bureaucratic state capitalism are not a new phenom~p?}:)ut 
have deep historical roots. On the other hand; they tend to 
equate the continuous expansion of.the·welfare function of the. State 
and the growth of centralised bureaucratic power at the expense 
of local initiative and responsibility with 'socialist'advance 
in the 'free' market coUntries, bypassing the fact that the 
control and intervention by the State becomes increasingly urgent 
in order to secure stability and project the 'free enterprise' 
system against the destabilising effects of the very contradictions 
whict,L it cr(;)ates and intensifies. Undoubtedly the development of 
the class and economic structure of the Soviet Union of today have 
been profoundly shaped by the linear mechanistic 'Marxist' 
conception, predominant in the BolsjevikParty, in which it was 
posited that no society could arrive-at socialism without going 
first through the capitalist stage (see Rudi Dutschke, Versuch 
Lenin Auf Die .Fusse Zu Stellen, Uber die halb-aziatische und 
Europaische Produktionsweise, Wagenbach; 1974). Lenin's view that 
a socialist society could be organised by coinbining .the 
transformation of productive.relations with the wholesale introduction 
of western technology (manifest in his great admiration for Taylor's 
'Scientific' management and his inter~st to rely on American 
Engineers) reveals a mechanistic undialectical conception regarding 
the relation between productive relations and productive forces. 
The Chinese insistence on both class struggle and self-reliance in 
production and scientific experiment reveals more confidence in 
the possibility that, if and when people are properly motivated and 
their creative potential is released through the transformation 
of social and productive relations and the search for appropriate 
forms of (self) management, innovation is a major source of capital 
creation and the expansion of productive forces (see John Sigurdson, 
'Rural Industry, A Traveller's View', China Quarterly, April-June 
1972, Roland Berger, 'Profile of a Chinese County', Geography 
April, 1972 and Charles Bettelheim, Revolution CultUre lIe 
Organisation Industrielle En Chine, Masper, Paris, 1973). 
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57. Bernard Laponche, Paris Colloquium, Unesco House, Paris, 1973. 
58. Ignacy Sachs, same colloquium. 
59. Paul Bairoch, Revolution Industrielle et Sous-Developpement, 
Sedes, Paris, 1963, pp. 200/201., 
60. Tamas Szentes, 'The environmental problem and the industrial 
investment patterns of m41tinational companies in the 'mhird World~, 
paper of the expert group meeting on alternative patterns of 
development, United Nations, Geneva, 13-18 May, 1974. 
61. Measures for Economic Development of Underdeveloped Countries, 
United Nations Report of a group of experts, New York, May, 1951. 
This report says (pp.15-16):'In our judgement, there are a 
number of countries where the concentration of economic and 
political power in the hands of a small class whose main interest 
is the preservation of its own wealth and privileges, rules out 
the prospect of much economic progress until a social revolution 
has effected a shift in the distribution of income and power'. 
62. It must be pointed out that the roots of the economic crisis 
which threatens the Western World are not located in the rise 
in prices of raw materials, particularly oil (the OPEC countries 
receive only a minor share of this price risei during the last 
few decades, oil has been a major factor in ,the rapid industrial 
expansion of the Westin, view of it:~ v~~y low cost) ': but that this 
crisis has endogenous roots and is the consequence of the inherent 
dynamics of the capitalist mode of production with its unceasing 
drive to maximise accumulation and the inherent necessity to raise 
and expand consumption in function of the process of accumulation. 
It would be contradictory if the germs of the disease were located 
within the nature of the societal system of the capitalist mode of 
production itself, since this would point to the necessity to seek 
and invite support for an alternative mode of production. To discharge 
the responsibility for the prevailing and developing crisis of the 
capitalist mode of production on the oil producing countries (and 
other Third World countries which are seeking to secure fa.:~r terms. 
of trade ~most raw material prices have actually declined ~ecentl3) is 
indispensibl~ if' the real :Lnter'est and' ideological valu~'~"U~derlYing 
the implicit acceptance of the productive relations in which these 
interests express themselves are to be safeguarded. 
For an analysis of the roots of the present crisis. see Geoffrey 
Barraclough, 'The Great World Crisis', The New York Review of Books, 
January 23, 1975.' 
